Hobbes+study+questions

The state of nature according to Hobbes is a ruthless state of war. The lack of security in a state of nature is caused by everyone’s equal ability to kill and this leads to a state of war. Hobbes argues that there is no difference between a state of nature and a state of war because in order to survive in a state of nature, every one must be prepared to fight. Humans in Hobbes’ state of war are equally vulnerable and cannot be sure of victory, so they resort to pre-emptive strike attacks. In such a state of war, I am continually under threat and in order to survive, I may kill someone before they have an opportunity to kill me. For the purpose of my argument I am assuming people are equal rational egoists. They act in self-interest for the purpose of self-preservation. This behavior combined with conflicting desires (survival) inevitably leads to fighting and competition because of a lack of trust in one another. This mutual insecurity reinforces Hobbes’ view that life is “solitary, poor, nasty, brutish and short" (ch. 13).
 * **Why is the state of nature a state of war in Hobbes?**

The concept of the ‘State of Nature’, is to be contrasted by the civil state according to Hobbes. The State of Nature is defined as the most basic and pure of human interaction **Unclear - [|xmarquez] Sep 5, 2008 11:00 pm    **. Civil states act according to laws issued by a sovereign in a social contract with the people **The contract is not with the people - that is a Lockean idea - [|xmarquez] Sep 5, 2008 11:00 pm    **. In contrast a State of nature consists of separate entities, acting autonomously as individual sovereigns. Acting autonomously, people are free to do what they want **This is not quite right, or at least is misleading - the important point is that they have a right to everything - [|xmarquez] Sep 5, 2008 11:00 pm    **. Humans are self-interested beings and therefore every action they take is purely for themselves **Not quite what Hobbes says; yes, human beings aim at some good to themselves, but the "purely" does not follow - [|xmarquez] Sep 5, 2008 11:00 pm    **. In order to survive in a place when each person is free to do what they like means people need to be prepared to fight each other for their own survival. In a situation where each person is competing for their own equal self-interest, these conflict of interest mean a constant state of war between each other. **THis could be better integrated with the previous paragraph, since it repeats some information <span style="background-color: rgb(255, 255, 221)"><span style="color: rgb(153, 153, 153)">- [|xmarquez]<span style="color: rgb(153, 153, 153)"><span style="background-color: rgb(255, 255, 221)"> Sep 5, 2008 11:00 pm    **

Similarities between the traditional prisoners dilemma and the state of nature as Hobbes describes it exist, and as such, the dilemma can be a helpful model to explain Hobbes’ state of nature.
 * **Is a prisoner's dilemma game a good model for Hobbes' state of nature? What does the prisoner's dilemma tell us (or fail to tell us) about the state of nature and its solution?**

At first it is difficult to understand why men, who naturally “seek peace and follow it” (chapter 14) are in this miserable condition of constant war (the "state of nature").

The prisoners dilemma results as follows. In the state of nature, people have an equal ability to to kill: the “weakest has strength enough to kill the strongest” (chapter 13), and “every man has a right to every thing,” including an equal desire (and right) to self defence, even to the point that such a right may impinge upon another's right to live. In instances where the right of one person to live may potentially impinge upon the rights of another, or where no incentives to refrain from doing so exist, the prisoners dilemma results. A person will attack another first, preemptively, because they cannot trust another person not to attack, and fear that they will attack. There is no incentive not to betray on either side - and thus both are wary of the potential of the other to strike first. Peaceful relationships are therefore very difficult to establish.

The traditional prisoners dilemma is here distinguished - as under a traditional model, repeated interactions between people eventually lead to cooperation and trusting relationships. In Hobbes' state of nature, the stakes of wrongfully trusting are so high (death) that repeated interaction cannot occur - indeed, interaction is unlikely to occur in the first place.. Trust can only be established where a high force (or a sovereign) alters the benefits that would have normally been the outcome of a betrayal. In such a situation, trust can exist because the sovereign wields the power of the collective - and it is in an individual's interest to cooperate - and know moreover that it is in other people's interests to do the same. It doesn't seem to address the flipside of the prisoners dilemma, in that people attack first before other people attack, but people don't attack first in order not to provoke an attack. If humans have a natural desire for peace then surely they won't desire increasing the chance of an attack **Assume there is some error in some people's calculations; will some people attack because they sense a provocation, even if the others don't attack? <span style="background-color: rgb(255, 255, 221)"><span style="color: rgb(153, 153, 153)">- [|xmarquez]<span style="color: rgb(153, 153, 153)"><span style="background-color: rgb(255, 255, 221)"> Sep 5, 2008 11:00 pm    **. - This will certainly be the case at times, but not all the time. If the state of nature is all about what is best for self-preservation, surely acting upon a perceived provocation decreases this immensely in the face of potential death?' Even if the act is say, going and trying to kill them in their sleep to maximise the chance of success, there is still the very real chance of failure. If the possibility of death clearly exists, then taking that possibility seems contrary to the reasoning behind the state of nature where self-preservation is paramount.
 * **Are Hobbes' assumptions about the state of nature plausible?**

You could however say that going up a ladder to fix your leaky roof aids self-preservation (from the rain and cold for many seasons) despite the chance that you may fall; it weighs up two issues of self-preservation and takes the one with the maximum benefit. This could then be seen as analogous to how killing a man for his cows aids self-preservation (milk for many seasons, meat, leather) despite the risk of failing and being killed yourself. I think in terms of the provocation and perception, it comes down to what your response to the possibility of being killed is? If you attack first on the possibility of being killed, you then increase the possibility of being killed in that attack (and having become the aggressor, your perception of provocation becomes reality). If you wait, only that first //possibility// of being killed exists. This is why people for the most part do not attack first, but rather retaliate, same on an international scale. Then again, I guess you could say that the person who attacked on perceived provocation was only retaliating. Then it's a matter of how you retaliate. You could simply leave or wait rather than confront. Rather than making perceived aggression reality by an aggressive response, you can wait in defense or leave. If nothing happens then it is just perception. I think it's a little more than Kill or be killed, A(ttack)/Not A, and this is how things empirically play out.

You can suspect that your roof leaks (sense a provocation), but you wouldn't act on it unless its dripping on you (attacking you, expressly threatening, etc). Only then do you take that terrible risk of climbing a ladder (attacking/killing). To pre-emptively re-tile your roof is great and industrious and so on, but if it actually didn't need fixing you haven't actually gained anything bar the risks associated with pursuing that action. Rather, you've lost something (money/your arm) that would have been spent on something actually conductive to your self-preservation like food because you acted pre-emptively rather than assessing the situation. I guess this all assumes rationality, which as Hobbes says is different in the state of nature. This however could be seen as saying that in special circumstances 1+1=3. You can't argue with it because you're not in those special circumstances and are using rationality from a state where 1+1=2. If you were in the circumstances where 1+1=3 it'd make sense to you. I don't really like this math analogy, but I think it makes the point.

All these arguments do seem to end up rather circular which is always a bad sign, yet always seems to happen.

If as Hobbes claims the natural desire for peace is our primary motivation (and hence why we would desire a sovereign to invest in), the possession of the state of distrust is then secondary and subordinate (chp14). The fact that we desire a sovereign (peace) surely negates our inherent natural distrust for the most part. If as in a state of nature we all simply attacked pre-emptively it doesn't seem possible that a sovereign could ever emerge. You could take it from that other angle that we never leave the state of nature and that the sovereign is simply a part of it, Hobbes is making distinctions where there are none. If you take Self-Preservation=State of Nature as true, then I think that we are never out of a state of nature. The creation of a sovereign isn't the removal of the state of nature but merely a case of 'I will pursue this option for the time being as it is in my best interests of self-preservation'. As long as it does work you follow it,

Hobbes' assumptions are of course based on the idea that our general suspicions of one another lead to distrust and to kill each other which empirically does not appear to be true. Perhaps though, this is because we are already under a sovereign **Precisely Hobbes' point <span style="background-color: rgb(255, 255, 221)"><span style="color: rgb(153, 153, 153)">- [|xmarquez]<span style="color: rgb(153, 153, 153)"><span style="background-color: rgb(255, 255, 221)"> Sep 5, 2008 11:00 pm    **. Even so, the possession of distrust and an overarching desire for self-preservation I do not think lead people immediately or inevitably to the State of Nature he envisions **Without a sovereign? Consider something like Somalia, or Iraq after the invasion <span style="background-color: rgb(255, 255, 221)"><span style="color: rgb(153, 153, 153)">- [|xmarquez]<span style="color: rgb(153, 153, 153)"><span style="background-color: rgb(255, 255, 221)"> Sep 5, 2008 11:00 pm    **. One cannot use a looted TV without the vast network of other people creating content, managing TV networks, providing electricity, and so on. It would suggest in a state of nature that we would kill somebody for a TV or steal one despite not being able to use it. This would suggest during a state of nature people are anticipating the point where they are no longer in a state of nature. Again this could come back to 'always being in a state of nature'.


 * The point is not that everyone has these passions; but what if enough people do? Remember, also, that what is rational in the state of nature is not rational in the civil state <span style="background-color: rgb(255, 255, 221)"><span style="color: rgb(153, 153, 153)">- [[image:http://www.wikispaces.com/user/pic/1202793136/xmarquez-sm.jpg width="16" height="16" caption="xmarquez" link="http://www.wikispaces.com/user/view/xmarquez"]][|xmarquez]<span style="color: rgb(153, 153, 153)"><span style="background-color: rgb(255, 255, 221)"> Sep 5, 2008 11:00 pm    .** In this case the state of nature seems self resolving: if there are enough people willing and wanting to kill each other to gain some perceived advantage and reduce somewhere such as Somalia to a 'State of Nature', eventually there won't be, having killed each other...

I think the underlying assumptions that complicate the viability of state of nature are as follows: - All People are rational - If they aren't, they're hardly going to conform to the state of natures theories let alone those of a civil state - All People act in the same way under the same conditions, have the same desires - All People are equally killable/capable of being killed. Clearly not. The weakest man probably couldn't strangle the strongest even in his sleep due to his huge neck muscles getting in the way, or stab him with enough force or whatever. Even if it's poison different people will have different reactions, and so on.


 * **Is a sovereign authority the only possible solution to the Hobbessian dilemma?**

In Hobbes' social contract, the sovereign is the only way to have security. For Hobbes, the sovereign is the most intelligent idea made by men to live in society. The creation of the sovereign is the only way to escape from the State of Nature. He will be the only capable authority to inculcate law and order in the society because it is the result of a common agreement. Everyone rational will follow the Sovereign's law because they are afraid of violent death (under Hobbesian analysis)**.** When Hobbes wrote the Leviathan: England did not have a real authority, there was civil war; nobody, in Hobbes perspective, could stop the Parliament. In contrast, France under Louis XIV was an absolute sovereign. No one questioned his authority and for Hobbes that is better than no authority at all. He despises anarchy. **What about repeated interactions leading to spontaneous social order? WHy is this not a solution to the state of nature? <span style="background-color: rgb(255, 255, 221)"><span style="color: rgb(153, 153, 153)">- [|xmarquez]<span style="color: rgb(153, 153, 153)"><span style="background-color: rgb(255, 255, 221)"> Sep 5, 2008 11:00 pm    ** Cooperation between people would not rationally occur because fear and distrust would prevent it. Death (or the fear of it) prevents future cooperation. The state of nature is a state of war - 'every man is against every man'(Chapter XIII). Hobbes believes that there can be no morality in a state of nature because there is ‘no common power’. This positivist approach to law means that without a common power (sovereign) no laws are made, without laws there is no injustice.**Sure, but what is the reason that Hobbes gives? Look at what he says about the right to everything in the state of nature <span style="background-color: rgb(255, 255, 221)"><span style="color: rgb(153, 153, 153)">- [|xmarquez]<span style="color: rgb(153, 153, 153)"><span style="background-color: rgb(255, 255, 221)"> Sep 5, 2008 11:00 pm    ** How is injustice brought about when there is no common power dispensing justice? If in the state of nature everybody is equally able to kill anybody else then each person will be looking to gain an advantage over their adversaries, real or imagined. In the act of self-preservation any action is legitimate. For these two reasons there is no such thing as lawful property belonging to an individual, there is only what an individual can retain through force. In the state of nature everyone owns everything. A person will look to build resources so they will be better able to defend themselves or to attack. If everybody is out to do the same thing then all bets are off, anything goes and there is no justice or injustice.
 * **Why is morality impossible in the state of nature?**

>“//…nothing can be unjust. The notions of right and wrong, justice and injustice, have there no place. Where there is no common power, there is no law; where no law, no injustice.//” (Chapter XIII)

Compounding the above analysis is Hobbes’ assertion that in a state of nature it is impossible to distinguish between ‘mine and thine’. If there is an inability in a state of nature to separate out individuals possessions from a situation where men only strive to get what they can get, and hold it for as long as they can(Chapter XIII), injustice cannot occur. There was no constructed ‘right’ to it in the first place. This would be different in a system that had a sovereign to dispense justice. **How exactly? <span style="background-color: rgb(255, 255, 221)"><span style="color: rgb(153, 153, 153)">- [|xmarquez]<span style="color: rgb(153, 153, 153)"><span style="background-color: rgb(255, 255, 221)"> Sep 5, 2008 11:00 pm    **

> “//It is consequent also to the same condition that there be no propriety, no dominion, no mine and thine distinct; but only that to be every man's that he can get, and for so long as he can keep it.//” Because acting in a moral way in a state-of-nature will not benefit you (you will not get what you want) he believes that humans must take rational actions to achieve what they want **Acting in a narrowly rational way in the state of nature will also not get you what you want - this is the prisoner's dilemma aspect of the situation, though the main point is right <span style="background-color: rgb(255, 255, 221)"><span style="color: rgb(153, 153, 153)">- [|xmarquez]<span style="color: rgb(153, 153, 153)"><span style="background-color: rgb(255, 255, 221)"> Sep 5, 2008 11:00 pm    **. Acting morally will not benefit a person and will lead to betrayal, therefore acting morally is not rational. Because morality isn't rational, in a state of nature morality does not exist and people are not obliged to act morally. For it to be rational to act morally there must be a coercive force that makes it beneficial for people to act morally. Hobbes’ argument is only plausible if we accept his argument for what is rational. If rationality dictated that serving the interests of a majority was more important than serving ones self, then it would be rational for people to act morally even in a state of nature. Prima facie, it appears that the incentives influencing individuals in the state of nature might preclude them from renouncing their rights to a sovereign. Some of the reasons for this might include:
 * **Is Hobbes' right about the non-existence of morality in the state of nature? What assumptions does he make to argue this claim, and are these assumptions plausible?**
 * **Is Hobbes right about the implication: if states in the international system are in a state of nature, then no state has obligations to other states? All is fair in war?**
 * **Is it likely that individuals in the state of nature would actually renounce their rights given that everyone is a self interested individual? Why / why not? Would such a society be stable?**

Individuals are unlikely to renounce their rights if they feel that they can protect themselves better than a sovereign can. A sovereign has the interests of everyone in mind which may mean they harm one person to protect the interests of another. An individual does not have to worry about looking out for the interests of anyone but him(her)self.

Further, people may be unwilling to submit themselves to tyranny without the sovereign first proving himself. However, the sovereign can not prove himself until he is in a place of leadership with everyone submitting to him. We arrive at a catch 22. The sovereign would never make it into power because all would need to submit for the concept of rule to be successful; I will not submit, therefore, the concept fails.

However, it may also be in an individual's best interests to submit. For example, in a war torn state of nature such as Hobbes describes, in which violence is a part of life, very few freedoms and rights are properly able to be exercised regardless. It could in fact be very much in an individuals self interest to subscribe to the protection of a sovereign promising peace and collective action against intruders - and while they may renounce their rights in a sense, a sovereign promises an environment in which other rights previously denied because of the state of nature can be exercised. If individuals are willing to believe a charismatic would-be-sovereign that they will in fact be better off under the rule of the sovereign (and it is not uncharacteristic of human nature to believe and sign up to something that is 'in their best interests', even if it perhaps is not), it is not inconceivable that they might renounce their rights.

It is fair to say that individuals are unlikely to unilaterally and spontaneously agree to renounce their rights - but if some do, and enjoy that (albeit weakened) protection and sense of community, others are likely to slowly join, particularly through networks of family and friendship. The more people that join, the greater the incentives on skeptics to join also. The greatest protection now lies in the community governed by the sovereign, and the weaker outsiders become relative to that community. It becomes in the outsiders best interests, as the party left vulnerable, to become part of the wider, more centrally focussed group. Not completely. If the modern world were one in which no one power were superior to another, chaos could ensue. States could be viewed as people equally able to kill each other. In contrast to the situation envisaged by Hobbes of equality, States differ significantly in military ability i.e ability to kill. If states are analogous to people and given the limited amount of supreme authority in the international sphere, Hobbesian theory would predict constant war **Remember, though, war is not actual battle, but a disposition thereto - see chapter 13 <span style="background-color: rgb(255, 255, 221)"><span style="color: rgb(153, 153, 153)">- [|xmarquez]<span style="color: rgb(153, 153, 153)"><span style="background-color: rgb(255, 255, 221)"> Sep 5, 2008 11:00 pm    **. The empirical truth is that constant war does not occur due to the various treaties, ideologies and Yankee/Western Hegemony that ensure a more stable world order (if only recently and not to the extent that Hobbes would expect). In other words, normative behaviours now act as a sovereign **Unclear <span style="background-color: rgb(255, 255, 221)"><span style="color: rgb(153, 153, 153)">- [|xmarquez]<span style="color: rgb(153, 153, 153)"><span style="background-color: rgb(255, 255, 221)"> Sep 5, 2008 11:00 pm    **.
 * **Is Hobbes' statement that sovereigns exist in a state of nature still applicable to 21st century society?**

The concept of comity of nations also enables harmonious (although not always) relations, often without a greater presidency to bind both parties to agreements etc.**Unclear - how does this get over the Hobbesian security dilemma? <span style="background-color: rgb(255, 255, 221)"><span style="color: rgb(153, 153, 153)">- [|xmarquez]<span style="color: rgb(153, 153, 153)"><span style="background-color: rgb(255, 255, 221)"> Sep 5, 2008 11:00 pm    **

While Christianity in many ways does attempt to fulfill the functions of a sovereign in terms of maintaining set behaviour, religion in and of itself cannot be as effective as a sovereign in mitigating conflict: One of the main strengths Hobbes notes of a sovereign (assuming that we accept his theory) is the ability to gather together the collective in order to punish bad conduct. The effectiveness of a religion as a sovereign partially depends on the mechanisms of that religion to punish bad conduct.
 * **Does Christianity (of the kind Erasmus preached) equal a sort of sovereign since norms of conduct are set out?**

- Where a religion has no control mechanism to ensure behaviour is regulated, the conduct of a person is therefore regulated only by conscience. The only being to whom a potential offender is accountable is God, and their decision to act or refrain from acting is limited only by the extent to which they believe in afterlife (or karma-type) retribution. While this may be effective for some, for many it is not as human immediate retribution is a more effective deterrent. It is moreover very difficult to find a unified interpretation of religion. This is illustrated well by the differences in the interpretation of Christianity seen between Erasmus and Aquinas. Where Erasmus advocated an absolute ban on conflict - often even in self defence, Aquinas favoured an interpretation that appeared to allow conflict in some instances. Even those who genuinely fear afterlife retribution may not believe that such retribution will come because the circumstances under which they engage in conflict are morally just, or allowable under a different interpretation of Christian ethic. If //all// people believed in a unified Erasmian Christianity, it may have the same impact (or better) as might a sovereign under Hobbes' theory at mitigating conflict, but it is a utopian theory and in some ways would make the question a truism. Because it is not a reality, Christianity under the status quo (even the status quo in Erasmus or Hobbes' time) did not, and does not equal a sovereign under Hobbes' rationalisation.

- In a society where the extreme majority of people believe in a single religion, it is arguable that immediate retribution is garnered through societal norms and pressures. Failure to adhere might result in penalties such as societal exclusion - and as such could be a more effective method of accountability. However, this relies on unified beliefs, high uptake, close knit, internalised communities and that the religion preached strict moral and behavioural regulation. It is unclear whether such society would be sustainable in the long term, and it is unclear whether community pressures would be as effective in maintaining behaviour as individual retribution. Societal pressures to adhere to generally common morals exist in many communities but do not preclude those who wish to contravene. Moreover, if one subscribes to Hobbes' portrayal of human nature, outliers might tend to react preemptively in fear of their own safety - as in such a community, prejudice against outsiders would generally tend to be fairly extreme, and outliers might well fear for their own safety.

- Where the church acted as a sovereign in terms of using the collective to enforce physical retribution of those who contravene, they then would literally equal a sort of sovereign - Hobbes would argue that it does not matter if the leader of a religious faction acted as a sovereign in this sense, they still possess the qualities of a sovereign and the benefits that therefore flow. The uptake of the religion would become immaterial if the physical retribution extended beyond believers, as long as the religion was able to effectively control a significant portion of the collective to enforce conduct. However, this type of society falls outside the scope of this question - as Christianity itself is not acting as a sovereign - humans believing in Christianity are. Hobbes can be justified as a realist because he always thinks about rationality before doing something in the political or social sphere. Thinking rationally **unclear - is this characteristic of realism? What is being said here? 1223061050** thinks about the issue rather then jumping to a conclusion that could be unrealistic. However, you could argue that some of Hobbes views are against realism, for example he argues that everyone is equal. Equal to kill, Everyone is strong enough to kill the strongest. How is this realistic? If you are not the strongest you will lose **even though the strongest needs to sleep, and even though other people can always temporarily band together to kill the strongest? Why is this not a possibility? 1223061050**. Not very rational at all. And if he thinks everyone equal he then decides that there is always a supreme authority that in the state of nature or civil society that has to be obeyed and you can not leave. Hobbes here has contridicted what he said earlier, this point is more realistic **I'm not sure I see the contradiction 1223061050**. As Hobbes describes in chapter 14 the fundamental law of nature for men is "to seek peace and follow it". But in the state of nature, in the "condition of war of every one against every one" the fundamental law of nature not 'applicable'. In chapter 17 Hobbes again says that the laws of nature (justice, mercy, modesty...) "are contrary to our natural passions, that carry us to partiality, pride, revenge, and the like" and therefore argue for a strong covenant to ensure security. Therefore, according to Hobbes a 'peaceful' society has to be constructed with a strong covenant and a strong sovereign who ensure the implication of the covenant. In Ancient and Medieval thoughts society grows 'naturally', it is the law of nature, that men cooperate in their individual interest and form a society.
 * **Can it be argued that Hobbes is always a realist, or are there aspects of his argument that go against typical realism?**
 * **How does Hobbes' position on the law of nature differ from ancient and medieval positions?**

A tyrant cannot be deposed:
 * **How does Hobbes differentiate between humans and animals if our natural passions are a sine qua non of both?**
 * **To rebel against a sovereign is against the many covenants agreed upon by the public, can a tyrant be deposed (Chpt. XVIII)?**

If people have already "instituted a Commonwealth, being thereby bound by covenant to own the actions and judgements of one, cannot lawfully make a new covenant amongst themselves to be obedient to any other, in anything whatsoever, without his permission."

Having renounced their rights to the sovereign, they cannot, therefore, without his leave, depose him and "return to the confusion of a disunited multitude; nor transfer their person from him that beareth it to another the" because "they are bound." If they do so, they " take from him that which is his own", which is unjust, and moreover, they break their covenant to that sovereign, which is also unjust. Hobbes does not sympathise with those caught attempting to commit such treasons, labelling the such a person "the author of his own punishment."

One cannot even break with a sovereign in the name of God (ie, swearing loyalty to God, not the sovereign), as Hobbes argues that no covenant can exist with God himself, only with God's representative on earth - the sovereign. Hobbes is scathing of those who use such an argument: "This pretence of covenant with God is so evident a lie, even in the pretenders' own consciences, that it is not only an act of an unjust, but also of a vile and unmanly disposition."

A man cannot depose a tyrant therefore, nor can he free himself from a tyrants rule: " none of his subjects, by any pretence of forfeiture, can be freed from his subjection." This is because when a sovereign makes a covenant with the people, he makes it with them all - and the rules must therefore apply to all people: "Because the major part hath by consenting voices declared a sovereign, he that dissented must now consent with the rest; that is, be contented to avow all the actions he shall do, or else justly be destroyed by the rest... And whether he be of the congregation or not, and whether his consent be asked or not, he must either submit to their decrees or be left in the condition of war he was in before; wherein he might without injustice be destroyed by any man whatsoever."